Send My: Arbitrary data transmission via Apple's Find My network

May 12, 2021
  • It's possible to upload arbitrary data from non-internet-connected devices by sending Find My BLE broadcasts to nearby Apple devices that then upload the data for you
  • We released an ESP32 firmware that turns the micocontroller into an (upload only) modem, and a macOS application to retrieve, decode and display the uploaded data:
  • Being inherent to the privacy and security-focused design of the Find My Offline Finding system, it seems unlikely that this misuse can be prevented completely


With the recent release of Apple's AirTags, I was curious whether Find My's Offline Finding network could be (ab)used to upload arbitrary data to the Internet, from devices that are not connected to WiFi or mobile internet. The data would be broadcasted via Bluetooth Low Energy and picked up by nearby Apple devices, that, once they are connected to the Internet, forward the data to Apple servers where it could later be retrieved from. Such a technique could be employed by small sensors in uncontrolled environments to avoid the cost and power-consumption of mobile internet. It could also be interesting for exfiltrating data from Faraday-shielded sites that are occasionally visited by iPhone users.

In theory this should be possible: If you can emulate two AirTags, you can encode data by activating only one of the two AirTags at a specific point in time. The receiving device could then check which AirTag is active at what time and decode this back to the original data. However, such a scheme seems highly unreliable and probably unusable in real-world situations due to its very low bandwidth (especially with restriction such as 16 AirTags per Apple ID it seemed like data transfer could be limited to only a few bits per hour).

Therefore, the feasibility of the idea depends on the system's design and implementation. It turned out that security and privacy decisions in the design of the Offline Finding mechanism make our "use case" quite efficient and almost impossible to protect against.

The result: Retrieving previously broadcasted/uploaded data with a custom Mac application

Offline Finding network description

Thankfully, the protocol has already been extensively reverse engineered by a group of TU Darmstadt, that published the paper "Who Can Find My Devices?" in March 2021 and released a proof-of-concept open source implementation called OpenHaystack, which allows you to create your own accessories that are tracked by Apple's Find My network. Huge credits to the team! Their work made this possible and both our PoC firmware and the Mac application are based on OpenHaystack.

A bit simplified, the Find My Offline Finding system works like this:

  1. When paring an AirTag with an Apple Device, an Elliptic Curve key pair is collaboratively generated with the public key remaining on the AirTag (and a shared secret to generate rolling public keys)
  2. Every 2 seconds, the AirTag sends a Bluetooth Low Energy broadcast with the public key as content (changes every 15 minutes deterministically using the previously shared secret)
  3. Nearby iPhones, Macbooks, etc. recognize the Find My broadcast, retrieve their current location, encrypt the location with the broadcasted public key (using ECIES) and upload the encrypted location report
  4. During device search, the paired Owner Device generates the list of the rolling public keys that the AirTag would have used in the last days and queries an Apple service for their SHA256 hashes. The Apple backend returns the encrypted location reports for the requested key ids
  5. The Owner Device decrypts the location reports and shows an approximate location

This quite elegant design comes with a few security properties, including:

  • Tracking protection against nearby adversaries via rolling public keys
  • No access for Apple to user locations

However, most interestingly for us, Apple does not know which public keys belong to your AirTag, and therefore which location reports were intended for you. This means the endpoint to request location reports for a specific key id does not perform any authorization (but you need to be authenticated with any Apple ID to access the endpoint).

The security solely lies in the encryption of the location reports: The location can only be decrypted with the correct private key, which is infeasible to brute force and only stored on the paired Owner Device.

Designing a data exfiltration protocol

From this it seems that the only field that we can use to encode data is the broadcasted EC public key (e.g. we can't influence the GPS coordinates as those are added by the Finding device).

For the next section, let's treat the Apple backend as a shared, public key-value store with SHA256 hashes as key, and encrypted location reports as value, with basic operations:

  • We can probe whether location reports for a specific SHA256 hash exist or not
  • We can add location reports to a specific SHA256 hash by broadcasting the corresponding public key

I guess you can already see where this is going: We can set arbitrary bits in the shared key-value store and query them again. If both the sender and receiver agree on an encoding scheme, we can transfer arbitrary data.

I set out to build a modem that takes a message via the serial interface and then sends out this data in a loop until a new message is received. To ensure we can differentiate a "0"-bit from an unset bit, we will broadcast a different public key depending on the bit value and will query both possible public keys on the receiving side.

There is no guarantee as to when or whether at all specific broadcasts are uploaded to the Apple backend as location reports. This is because some packets might not reach any Apple device and the Finding devices can have highly variable delays between receiving a broadcast and uploading the location report, e.g. depending on their upstream connectivity or power mode. This means our data encoding must be independent of the ordering in which location reports are received, and able to recover partial data streams when some bits are missing entirely. To achieve this, I decided to encode a single bit of data per broadcast together with an index value indicating which bit of the message is being set. Additional message and modem IDs allow the system to be reused for multiple messages and by multiple users.

So when sending a specific bit, we create a 28-byte array of the form "[4b bit index] [4b message ID] [4b modem ID] [padding 0s...] [bit value]", treat this as the public key and send BLE advertisements to e.g. broadcast the information "bit 0 of message 0 is 1".

To send a full message, the program simply loops over its bits and sends out one advertisement per bit with the public key that encodes its index and value.

Encoding message bits into broadcast payloads

When fetching data, the receiving application will generate the same 28-byte arrays (two per bit, for the possible bit values 0 and 1) and query the Apple service with the SHA256 hashes of those "public keys". Only one of the two key ids should have location reports attached, which can then be interpreted (e.g. bit at index 0 equals 1).

Retrieving previously sent data from an Internet-connected macOS device

Note: Instead of only transferring one bit per message, we could also e.g. send a full byte by setting the last 8 bit of the public key. While this increases the sending bandwidth, on the receiving side, we now need to request 255 different key ids to fetch/"brute force" one byte (compared to 16 key IDs when it's encoded bit-by-bit).


Sending side

For the sending side I chose the ESP32, as it is a very common and low-cost microcontroller (and in a quick test it could change its BT MAC address much more quickly than e.g. a Linux-based Raspberry Pi). On boot, the OpenHaystack-based firmware broadcasts a hardcoded default message and then listens on the serial interface for any new data to broadcast in a loop until a new message is received. Broadcasting the public key actually means splitting it up and encoding the first 6 bytes in the Bluetooth MAC address (except for the first two bits as the Bluetooth standard requires them to be set to 1). You can check Section 6.2 in the TU Darmstadt paper for more details on this hacky encoding.

I added a static prefix to my payload to not run into issues with the BT specification, and also included the incrementing bit index in the first 6 bytes of the public key, resulting in a different BT MAC address used for each transmitted bit, just in case there is some MAC address based rate limiting somewhere in the stack.

Serial console output of the ESP32 modem

Retrieval side

The Mac application is also based on OpenHaystack and uses the same AppleMail plugin trick to send properly authenticated location retrieval requests to the Apple backend. The user is prompted for the 4 byte modem ID (can be set when flashing the ESP firmware), after which the application will automatically fetch, decode and display the message with id 0. Afterwards the user can fetch other messages or change the modem.

A message is fetched 16 bytes (128 bit) at a time (by querying 256 key ids) until no reports can be found (for a full byte).

Small complication: public key validity

Having implemented both the sending and receiving side, I performed a first test by broadcasting and trying to receive a 32 bit value. After a few minutes, I could retrieve 23 out of the 32 bits, each one being unambiguous and with ~100 location reports, but no reports for the remaining 9 bits.

I suspected that some of the generated public keys were rejected by the nearby Apple Devices during the ECIES encryption as invalid public keys, and could quickly confirm this by trying to import each of the generated payloads as SEC1-encoded public keys on the P224 curve using Python's fastecdsa: For every bit that I could not find location reports for, the microcontroller had broadcasted a public key, which throws an InvalidSEC1PublicKey exception during the fastecdsa key import.

Some background info on the crypto involved:

  • The 28-byte EC public represents the SEC1-encoded X coordinate of a point
  • A SEC1 public key usually also has a "sign" bit that defines which of the two possible Y coordinates for a specific X coordinate should be encoded. This bit is not broadcasted and irrelevant for the public key's validity
  • During the decoding of a compressed public key, the corresponding Y coordinate is calculated using the fixed curve parameters and tested for validity. This is the test that fails for some of the generated public keys. You can check Section 3.2.2 of "Validation of Elliptic Curve Public Keys" for more details:

There are at least two ways to solve this problem of invalid public keys:

  1. Before broadcasting a payload, check whether the EC point it represents is actually valid for the used curve. If not, increment a counter until a valid public key is found. This process is deterministic and can similarly be performed offline by the retrieval application before querying a key id
  2. Interpret the payload as private key (instead of public key). While a compressed 28 byte public key is interpreted as the X coordinate of a potential point on the curve, a 28 byte private key is interpreted as the scalar in a EC point/scalar multiplication, thus always resulting in a valid point on the curve (the public key)

The second option has the advantage that for each received bit, we'd also be able to decrypt the location reports to find out the location it was received at, but it requires a bit more processing. While implementing this option, I found that due to bugs in the EC multiplication implementation of the used uECC library, for some private keys the ESP would calculate different public keys than both BoringSSL on Mac and Python's fastecdsa (accidential differential fuzzing?). Those public keys were even treated as invalid by uECC's own uECC_valid_public_key() function. I therefore chose to go with option 1 for this PoC.

Encoding and sending a message

Testing / Performance

With the public key validity check implemented, everything worked flawlessly. While I didn't do extensive performance testing and measurements, here are some estimates:

  • The sending rate on the microcontroller is currently ~3 bytes/second. Higher speeds could be achieved e.g. simply by caching the encoding results or by encoding one byte per advertisement
  • In my tests, the receiving rate was limited by slow Mac hardware. Retrieving 16 bytes within one request takes ~5 seconds
  • The latency is usually between 1 and 60 minutes depending on how many devices are around and other random factors. The following graphic shows the delay distribution between a public key broadcast and the corresponding location report being uploaded. Please note however, that this is per location report upload and does not directly represent the time until broadcasted data can be downloaded (already the first location report from any nearby Apple devices suffices for this)
Report delays measured by the TU Darmstadt team, from "Who can Find My Devices?"

Potential use cases

While I was mostly just curious about whether it would be possible, I would imagine the most common use case to be uploading sensor readings or any data from IoT devices without a broadband modem, SIM card, data plan or Wifi connectivity. With Amazon running a similar network called Sidewalk that uses Echo devices there might very well be demand for it. Since the Finding devices cache received broadcasts until they have an Internet connection, the sensors can even send out data from areas without mobile coverage as long as people pass the area.

In the world of high-security networks, where combining lasers and scanners seems to be a noteworthy technique to bridge the airgap, the visitor's Apple devices might also become feasible intermediaries to exfiltrate data from certain airgapped systems or Faraday caged rooms.

It also seems like the Offline Finding protocol could be used to deplete nearby iPhone's mobile data plans. With the number of location reports from a Finder device being limited (to 255 reports/submission due to a 1 byte count value) and each report being over 100 byte, broadcasting many unique public keys should result in an amplified amount of mobile traffic sent by the phone. While I haven't noticed any rate limiting on the number of location reports sent out, I also haven't tested how much data this would consume.


As mentioned initially, it would be hard for Apple to defend against this kind of misuse in case they wanted to.

Apple designed the system on the principle of data economy. They cannot read unencrypted locations and do not know which public keys belong to your AirTag, or even which public key a certain encrypted location report belongs to (as they only receive the public key's SHA256 hash).

In this light, the stated restriction of 16 AirTags per Apple ID seems interesting, as to me it does not seem that Apple can currently enforce this.

However, further hardening of the system might e.g. be possible in the following two areas:

  • Authentication of the BLE advertisement. Currently, Finder devices can not differentiate between e.g. an AirTag and a clone based on OpenHaystack, thus allowing the spoofing of many thousand non-existing AirTags to encode and transmit data. Usually one would consider signing the public keys, however with the BLE advertisement size already completely used up, AirTags being low power and not connected to the internet, and the broadcasted keys constantly rotating, this presents quite a challenge.
  • Rate limiting of the location report retrieval. While Apple does not know whether the requested key id belongs to one of the requesting user's AirTag, they could cache the requested key ids and ensure that only 16 new key ids are queried per 15 minutes and Apple ID (after allowing a much higher number for an initial search during the last days). While easier to implement, this mitigation can be bypassed by cycling through multiple free Apple IDs for data retrieval.


In this blog post, we have answered the initial question, whether it's possible to upload arbitrary data using other people's Apple devices, with a clear yes.

An ESP32 modem firmware and macOS data retrieval application was implemented and is available on Github for others to experiment with.

Please note that this is a PoC implementation and the "protocol" itself is neither encrypted nor authenticated. Exemplary, you can explore the data of modem ID 0x42424242 by simply entering its ID (maybe in the meantime somebody has also demonstrated the protocol's lack of authentication 😉).

Final note: While writing this blog post, I noticed a "status" byte that is included in the BLE advertisement and apparently used e.g. as battery level indicator. In combination with deterministically generated rotating private keys, this is probably another way to leak data with one byte per advertisement, but I haven't tested this approach.

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